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How does it stand with Scandinavian attempts to democratize technological
choice? How can those efforts improve
our grasp of the politics of technology?
These are questions posed by an outsider. As a reader of books and articles, I
have followed the projects carried out
during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, work
that sought to politicize technological
choices in Scandinavian countries and to
illuminate a theoretical grasp of what
such work entails. The early history of
sociotechnical job design, the Iron and
Metals project of the 1970s, the work
and ideals of the 1980s Arbetslivsentrum, the DEMOS, UTOPIA and Florence projects, and other such initiatives—all are chapters well worth
studying. Along with other American social scientists, I’ve consumed with great
relish corresponding sociological reports
of design experiments in Swedish auto-

mobile manufacturing, studies of efforts
in community control of technology in
Denmark, as well as the writings of
Scandinavian scholars in science and
technology studies and design theory.
Whether these reports portray successes or failures, they have always
seemed to me most promising, not only
for the ways they might help us understand the origins and dynamics of technological change, but also for possible
help in getting a handle on matters that
citizens of liberal democratic societies
find baffling and inaccessible. My own
connection to these matters stems from
an ongoing project that interprets technological choices from the standpoint of
classical and contemporary political theory. The issues that matter from this
standpoint are one that concern a range
of entities I call “political artifacts”. Political artifacts are devices and systems
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that are, on the one hand, useful and economically productive, but whose features also contain ways of expressing important features of civic culture—
relationships of power, authority, order,
control, freedom, justice and injustice.
At a historical period in which technological innovation is a major source of
change in patterns of living, the politics
of any group or nation comes to be embodied in the forms and conditions of operation of the artifacts it employs. For
that reason, political thought and practice must attend increasingly to the realm
of material things. This is, to be sure, not
all that politics is about; there is still
much in political society that has little or
nothing to do with technology as such.
But given the scope and intensity of technological change and its consequences, a
focus on political artifacts warrants
greater attention than it has had until
now. (Cf. L. Winner, The Whale and the
Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of
High Technology, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1986).
There is at present an enormous gap
between the political artifacts in the everyday lifeworld and the conventional
politics of elections and governments.
This gap became visible briefly during
the American presidential elections of
1992. In a move to show how close he
was to ordinary people, the President
George Bush visited a supermarket and
actually made some purchases. As he
stood at the cash register he saw the clerk
using a laser scanner to tally the prices.
“Is this for checking out?” Bush exclaimed, obviously very surprised. The
press and public were simply appalled
that the President could be so out of
touch with the lives of ordinary people as
to not know what a scanner is. Of course,

machines of this kind have been around
for more than ten years. People began to
ask: If President Bush doesn’t know
about these things, what else doesn’t he
know?
Even those shocked at the President’s
ignorance, however, missed an interesting story right in front of them. For the
presence of the Universal Product Code
on packages and the increasing prevalence of laser scanners in shops is a reflection of developments that are shaping the broader civic culture in the U.S.
and elsewhere—the rise of a sociotechnical regime that seeks to control not
only product inventories but to influence
people’s ideas and behavior within technically mediated and ever more tightly
interwoven relationships that include advertising, television, computerized data
bases, and consumer purchases. Yet the
forms of power that characterize this and
similar regimes are seldom matters for
public scrutiny.
The fact that President Bush was not
familiar with scanners mirrors a deeper
condition in which important aspects of
sociotechnical governance of everyday
life are invisible to just about everybody.
As systems like the universal product
code develop, there are choices made
about the form and operation of the system, choices that eventually affect civic
culture in a broad sense. Choices in this
domain affect people’s sense of social
membership, of personal efficacy and
content of life’s possibilities. To understand the changes in modern political society, one has to understand (among other things) the design and development of
things like supermarket scanners. For as
we invent such things we also invent the
kinds of people who will use them, the
very same kinds of people who will in-
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habit the polity in years to come. The distinctive personas of the industrial worker, the scientifically trained professional,
the modern house wife, the satisfied middle class consumer, and other now familiar character types were inventions of a
sort, social creations of earlier periods.
As we look at innovations on today’s
drawing boards (or CAD/CAM displays), the question is not so much how
they will “work,” but what their outlines
presuppose about who will use them.
In some notable Scandinavian approaches to the shaping of work environments, computers and social organization and the like, the significance of
political artifacts and the “who” of social
membership seems to be strongly
grasped. This awareness is expressed not
merely as description, analysis or critique of existing scientific and technological practice (the common approach
among many European U.S. intellectuals), but as a more positive stance that
tries to open up the key questions for
study, debate and more broadly based
public choice. In ways that seem to me at
once obvious and yet difficult to pin
down, recent projects in work place environments and computer systems development share something of the same basic moral and aesthetic sensibility as
projects long associated with the term
“Scandinavian design”—a concern for
how to achieve graceful, humane relationships between material form and
quality of people’s lives reflected in architecture, city planning, furniture, and
ergonomically designed tools. For that
reason, people interested in the relationships between politics and material culture in contexts other than computers in
the contemporary work place can have
much to offer.

Yet for all of the interesting features
of Scandinavian inquiries into the relationships between design, technological
development and changes in political
culture, it is difficult for an outsider to
tell how widespread they have become
and whether these initiatives have been
on balance successes or failures. On the
one hand there are strong suggestions
that efforts to democratize technology
are grounded in long-standing practice,
that they are supported in law and public
policy and agreements between unions
and employers associations, that they are
an important aspect of larger movements
in Scandinavian countries to realize industrial democracy and economic democracy. There is also the suggestion
that projects of this kind have actually
produced varieties of hardware, software
and social relations within and around
technological systems that are superior
to corresponding developments that
would have issued from the unmodified
dynamics of global capitalism. Specifically, there is said to be much less Taylorism, less surveillance, less centralism
and oligarchy, fewer invidious social distinctions; by the same token, reports tell
of greater equality of access, greater care
for the dignity of work and, indeed, what
seems to be a stronger acknowledgement
of the wholeness, intricacy and integrity
of cultural development—all expressed
within the structures and operating conditions of at least some technologies now
implemented in Scandinavian countries.
But there is also a strong undercurrent in the published literature that says
these efforts are at best tentative and
their larger potential unrealized. Some
projects seem to have fallen short of their
initial aims, while others seem to have
encountered damaging local opposition.
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The broader economic and political conditions that have supported the efforts
also seem clouded. Their future seems
overshadowed by what may be an erosion of electoral support for social democratic policies more generally.
At a time in which detailed studies of
the social dimensions of workplace technology seem to be flourishing, a time in
which Scandinavian researchers have
joined those from other parts of the
world to explore “cooperative design”
and related topics, the political dimensions of this tradition of inquiry could
easily be overshadowed by purely professional concerns. Hence, it is worth
asking: What are the key lessons of various encounters between technology and
politics in Scandinavia during the past
two decades?
Which avenues of research, development and social action have proved fruitful and which have not?
Should these efforts change our basic
understanding of processes of technological change or of the relationship between social organization and the patterns of technological systems?
Where is research in this area headed? Or perhaps more to the point, where
should it be going? And which conditions in the larger economic and political
environment are likely to affect what is
desirable or possible?
Given the hopes announced by
projects of the past, what are the living
possibilities for research and action?
Which possibilities are exhausted?
The direction of hopeful, democratically inspired Scandinavian experiments
in technology choice seem to stand in direct contrast to what is in many parts of
the world the standard narrative of technological development. In this oft-re-

peated melodrama, society is greeted by
material improvements that promise increased efficiency and economic productivity. Directly in the path of this development, however, are people who have
not been directly involved in producing
the new systems but who stand to experience the consequences of their coming.
In their eyes the development is ambiguous. While they may appreciate economic contributions of technological change,
they themselves stand to receive little
benefit. Instead they face loss of jobs,
dissolution of their communities, the disruption of ways of life predicated upon
sociotechnical patterns of earlier times,
and the creation of new patterns they find
disagreeable.
As the story unfolds, there are episodes of protest, conflict and/or negotiation. The technical development matures, bringing into sharper contrast the
issues that divide the promoters of the innovation from those whose interests will
be adversely affected. Eventually there is
a breaking point where the plans of the
innovators and developers succeed and
the qualms, resistance and hopes of those
in the path of technical change are swept
aside. Those whose interests were damaged by the development’s “creative destruction” must somehow find ways to
accommodate it.
This is, roughly speaking, the pattern
of technological change that characterizes mechanization, rationalization, automation, and computerization in much of
the 19th and 20th centuries. In narratives
of this kind ordinary people experience
the coming of technological change as
something almost completely external.
Innovation stems from the needs of entrepreneurs, business firms, industrial research labs, and government bureaucra-
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cies. Ordinary workers, consumers or
citizens are not involved in the creation
of the changes, except at the receiving
end. Neither do they see themselves as
having any knowledge or competence
that qualifies them to deal with the
changes at hand. Their lot in life is to absorb the “impacts” and to embrace the
ideology that what is happening to them
can truly be called “progress.”
A fairly typical version of this story
unfolded in the development of the
mechanization of sea going cargo during
the post-World War II period. The case
of longshoremen on the West Coast of
the United States, a case that I have studied in some detail, is especially interesting because the workers directly affected
by the change were politically left wing
and had a record of successful strikes and
bargaining with the shippers.
At the end of the 1950s, the union
was confronted with a series of technological innovations that would change
the shipping business in fundamental
ways. Union leaders saw mechanization
as an inevitable and even desirable development in forces of production. They
also knew that they had no say in the development of the hardware, software and
organizational form of the new technology.
The machines and systems favored
by the shipping companies were always
presented to longshoremen as finished
entities. What the union could do was to
negotiate about wages, work rules and
whom would man the equipment. But as
events unfolded, it became obvious that
they had lost power over dock work and
that most of their numbers would become redundant.
Expressing the feelings of a good
many of his co-worker, one speaker at a

1966 labor caucus exclaimed, “It scares
me, it scares the hell out of me: this new
robot-manning stuff....These guys (the
employers) are coming up with a lot of
new things. I know you can’t stop
progress, we can’t stop their manning
and new implements; but boy! Pretty
soon with all this money we get, we
aren’t going to be around to get it.”
(Quoted from L. Fairley, Facing Mechanization: The West Coast Longshore
Plan, Los Angeles, Institute of Industrial
Relations, monograph 23: 1979, p. 244.)
What the union members chose at
that point was, in effect, to negotiate
their own demise, receiving cash settlements that would enable them to retire
early. Some of the men I interviewed
took the money and moved to a fishing
community south of San Francisco. They
wanted to be near the sea and thought
they would be able to support themselves
in a dignified line of work. Alas, many of
these men found that technological
change was yet again their undoing. For
there arrived a generation of larger, more
efficient, electronically sophisticated
trawlers that made their smaller boats
and traditional fishing routines uncompetitive. The men affected felt as if they
had been pursued by technically embodied demons whose purpose it was to destroy a person’s prospect for meaningful
work and personal autonomy.
Among scholars who study such episodes there is a continuing debate between those who find elements of technological or economic determinism as
decisive and those who favor some account that emphasizes the social shaping
or social construction of new technologies. This debate is carried out in theoretical treatises and historical case studies.
Today it is fashionable among academics
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to conclude that the people do have a
choice in the “social construction” of
technology, that there are no historical
determinisms, no technological imperatives; social agents construct technologies and live happily every after. It’s extremely comforting, almost (yawn) sleep
inducing.
Zzzzzzzzz. Zzzzzzzzz. Oh, oh. Prof.
Winner has dozed off reading the latest
piece of soothing, social constructionist
lore. Someone give him a poke!
What? Who? Oh, yes... You can take
the story of the West Coast longshoremen and tell it as a moral fable of technological determinism or as a moral fable
of social construction of technology. You
can fashion a perfectly coherent and in
some sense “true” story in either version.
But whichever side one may take in this
debate, the fact is, in my view, that such
discussions are largely sterile. They are
sterile because they do not point to ways
that anybody might have done things differently or ought to have wanted to do so.
For that reason, much of the erudite discourse in contemporary science and
technology studies is distinctly unhelpful, non-empowering.
For example, the implicit advice of
those who offer theories of the social
shaping or social construction of technology perspective is that people might
find ways to be more effective in becoming decisive actors who shape patterns of
change. But this is often hollow counsel.
For the opportunities for action typically
exist only within carefully guarded
boundaries of power and privilege. And
beyond that, what in the world are the
choices? As regards the transportation of
cargo, for example, the intention to move
freight effectively and efficiently means
huge ships, filled with huge boxes and

huge ships loaded by computer controlled cranes. From the point of view of traditional longshoremen, what were the interesting possibilities for the social
shaping of new technologies that might
have preserved or fruitfully modified
their way of life?
In the context of theoretical debates
about determinism and social shaping of
technology, the Scandinavian projects
offer a number of very promising departures. One distinguishing feature in some
Scandinavian approaches, for example,
is to take seriously the design of technological devices for the qualities of social
life they sustain and the everyday political habits they nurture. Unlike the prevailing tendencies in analyses of technological choices they directly confront
human concerns other than economic
growth, competitiveness, risky technologies, and environmental crisis that usually define what people find thinkable
nowadays. That is no small accomplishment. A great many people concerned
with technology policy believe that the
only questions that could ever matter in
technology policy are ones that have to
do with productivity, international competitiveness, risks to health and safety,
and severe environmental problems.
“Don’t bother us and our business plan
unless the ozone layer really is vanishing.”
Another point of departure in some of
the Scandinavian approaches is that they
affirm as both social policy and research
method that impending technological developments should not be regarded as
something external to the lives of those
who will eventually be affected. There is
an affirmation that having a say in the design and application of new instruments
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is a basic right that derives from citizenship, not just property ownership.
Yet another point of departure is an
affirmation that ordinary people are capable of being directly involved in shaping new technologies. They already
know a great deal that is useful and, beyond that, can educate themselves further in areas of technical knowledge usually supposed to be the sheltered
domains of experts. This work involves
creating new institutional settings in the
co-creation of alternatives in ways that
not only represent a wider variety of interests than has typically been the case in
modern industrial history. There is even
the promise that within such institutional
settings something close to the public interest itself might emerge.
Another promising feature in much
of this work is the recognition that technological development can fruitfully
draw upon a much richer array of human
fundamentals than the mechanistic technical and economic models that have
prevailed until now. One can draw upon
models in philosophy and anthropology,
and sociology to ensure that systems are
not spawned and nurtured by a one-dimensional rationality. This means that
beyond the critique of instrumental rationality lies a body of understanding
and fruitful practice that one can begin to
teach the next generation of technical
professionals and ordinary citizens. Indeed, this dimension of Scandinavian
projects is the one most closely mirrored
in North America at present, where the
development of new intellectual agendas
and research programs for making better
technological systems far outpaces any
concrete political efforts. The overall
promise is that will see the rise of an orientation toward planning and design that

can produce qualitatively superior systems, ones that are fully respectable in an
economic and technical sense, but which
incorporate a much wider spectrum of
democratically relevant features in their
shape and performance. Hence, democracy can be manifest in the process, in
the evolving creation of technical knowledge and practice. Perhaps it will even be
tangibly apparent within the lasting
forms of the technological devices and
systems in widespread use.
If the qualities I have mentioned accurately reflect the real character of the
Scandinavian initiatives, perhaps there is
an even larger meaning one can find in
them: that technological change may be
oriented to the development of humanity
rather than the other way around. At
present too much of what is called “innovation” involves manipulating humans
beings as raw material for technical and
economic development. I say that some
Scandinavian projects “seem” to move
in a promising direction because I still
don’t feel qualified to judge whether or
not these possibilities have been fulfilled, that the destinations suggested
have been reached. Based upon my readings and conversations with Scandinavian colleagues, I have a set of lingering
questions that I hope may produce further discussion.

1. Is the central theme of Scandinavian
encounters between technology and politics still that of democratic participation
in design and development? Or has the
focus now moved elsewhere, perhaps toward a search for a better understanding
of issues about the quality of computer
systems among professionals doing research in this field?
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During a year in Oslo, 1991-1992, I
heard more than one knowledgeable person say: Participation was a central concern a decade ago, but it isn’t any much
any longer. One reason sometimes given
is that, when all is said and done, the internal workings of technological systems
are simply too boring for most people.
As Oscar Wilde once quipped: “The
trouble with socialism is too many
evening meetings.” Perhaps the Achilles
heal in attempts to democratize technological design and development is that it
is time consuming, tedious and conflict
ridden in ways that most people don’t
find particularly rewarding.

2. What are the actual products of action-oriented research on technology and
democracy? Are the results primarily
those of improved social processes? Or
are there tangible artifacts that have
emerged from this work -- patterns of relationships between humans, hardware
and software that, for example, one
could map as a drawing or observe in
some working form?
This question stems from my own interest for the ways in which politics is
expressed in design, not only designing
as an activity, but in design reflected in
the concrete form of human made things.
As a writer I want to depict political artifacts of various kinds: buildings, tools,
machines, visualization of various forms
of computer software, and so forth. If democracy has been realized in the form of,
say, computer systems in the work place,
where can one see blueprints, diagrams,
photographs, or functioning models? If
the products of successful attempts of
this kind cannot be depicted in ways that
enable others to visualize them, I wonder

how easily they can be fruitfully emulated beyond their initial trials.

3. Specifically with regard to computer
systems, can one say that developments
in the democratization of design have
produced ideas expressed in either hardware or software that are significantly
different from those that eventually issued from purely profit seeking capitalist
firms?
As I look at the system interfaces of
the UTOPIA project, for example, they
look a lot like the kinds of things that
eventually came out as Macintosh, Windows, and other “user friendly” software. If you can get the qualities of flexibility, open access and comfortable fit in
commercially developed products, then
why worry about democratic design at
all? Can Xerox PARC and Seattle yuppies save human freedom?

4. Can Scandinavian-style efforts
change technological systems and their
consequences in truly substantial ways,
or are we dealing with the superficial, essentially cosmetic aspects of technological interfaces, leaving the deeper structures unaffected? I am haunted by the
example of William Morris who had an
extremely profound critique of forms of
industrialism as they affected the qualities of everyday life. But Morris’ practical contributions to the reform of material culture were to produce wallpaper and
furniture with lovely neo-medieval decorations, using essentially the same mechanized processes everybody else used at
the time. Are contemporary responses to
the politics of technology any more effective in getting to the core of the matter?
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5. What is the relationship between
Scandinavian efforts to broaden and democratize social influences upon technological choice and global economic and
political forces? Can such efforts survive
and flourish within the constellation of
market forces and government policies
of economic liberalization that characterize the 1990s?
One point of view I have heard recently argues that the Scandinavian efforts in alternative technology are (1)
simply insignificant when held up to global forces of economic and technological
change; (2) clearly doomed when confronted with the overwhelming forces of
economic rationalization within particular nations and the ever more tightly interlinked global webs of transnational
capitalism and (3) probably of diminishing interest to labor unions whose survivalist mentality now inclines them toward ever closer cooperation with
management in the quest for tools and
methods that reflect no-nonsense standards of productivity and competitiveness. Taking that viewpoint, some of my
leftist colleagues are inclined to argue
that Scandinavian experiments in democratizing technology are trivial, not
worth their attention. This includes some
scholars who held high hopes for such
efforts ten years ago.

6. Given the legacy of projects and experiments of various kinds, what are the
logical next steps? What are the emerging fields of interest for research and policy?
These questions come from a person
who lives in a supposedly democratic society, the U.S.A., where the idea that
technologies might be shaped in democratic, politically benign ways is almost

never a research question. All the initiatives stem from business interests and
they solicit citizen views only in ways
they can control, e.g., market surveys
about products in the works. University
research and development laboratories
seldom focus upon the broader social dimensions of their projects for fear of
jeopardizing private and government
funding. Perhaps the closest thing we
have to an Arbetslivcentrum is the Office
of Technology Assessment which produces a seemingly endless series of plain
vanilla, notoriously uncommitted analyses of pending technological changes
whose outcome, it is assumed, must ultimately be decided by private enterprise.
It is easy for Americans to over-idealize the Scandinavian approaches and to
over-estimate their influence. Equally
easy for us (since it is now our ingrained
political reflex) is the move toward cynicism, producing critiques that dismiss
everything as worthless. Neither mood
seems up to the challenge we face in
evaluating what has been accomplished
and what might yet be done. In my view,
the hope of understanding the relationship between technology and civic culture in a positive, critical sense enjoys at
present much brighter prospects on Nordic shores than in the U.S. What one
finds in Scandinavia is a background of
understanding and historical, practical
experience receptive to the idea that the
intricacies of technological choice can
provide opportunities for cultivating democracy and social justice. Scholarly
communities who have knowledge on
this score should remain open to debate
about the wider political horizons of
their inquiries, rejecting the mood that
sees research as professional, rigorous,
and useful, but no longer fully engaged.
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